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Introduction
Multiculturalism has often been criticized because of its tendency to 
essentialize culture and fixate cultural borders. In addition, it has been 
accused of overlooking the dynamic nature of the meeting of cultures. 
As multiculturalism is based on the assumption that all the members of 
a cultural group share a single culture, it would be extremely diﬃ  cult to 
recognize the subjectivity and role of individuals crossing cultural borders. 
These criticisms are raised by anthropologists, but it cannot be denied 
that anthropology as well as anthropological concept of culture is deeply 
responsible for such problems. More than ten years ago Prof. Nishkawa 
Nagao problematized the very concept of culture: he pointed out that the 
idea of culture is the project of the modern nation-state. For Nishikawa, 
civilization is the ideology of a nation-state called France, an early 
developer, while Kultur or culture is the ideology of a nation-state called 
Germany which was a late developer. According to Nishikawa, cultural 
anthropologists, by removing the state from the concept of culture, ended 
up blinding our eyes to the ideological dimension deeply rooted in the very 
idea of culture. 
According to the classic definition of culture, a group of people is 
supposed to have a unique culture; neighboring cultures may share many 
cultural traits but they are considered to be organized in diﬀ erent ways. 
Ruth Benedict used "pattern" to express this aspect of culture; diﬀ erently 
shaped but made of essentially similar stuﬀ . 
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But, at the popular level, cultures, usually identified with national 
cultures, are regarded as standing apart and distinctively different 
from one another. National culture, in its jealous effort at unifying and 
homogenizing the people within its national territory into a nation, creates 
national cultural identity. The formation of identity requires the existence 
of the Other; so we now know that alterity is but another name for 
identity.   
When identity and alterity were used to justify unequal power 
relationship and exploitation, national cultures became extremely jealous 
and paranoid, demanding undivided loyalty and conformity, and not 
allowing deviance and dual allegiance. One remedy is the emphasis on 
intercultural understanding and tolerance toward the Other. However, 
whether you believe in the clash of civilizations or dialogue among 
cultures, you ﬁ nd yourself stuck in the binary oppositions of "we vs. they" 
"civilized vs. savage" "Europe vs. the Other" etc. 
The idea of "I-Culture (Watakushi bunka)" as proposed by Nishikawa 
Nagao provides a way out of this straight jacket. By taking one's attention 
on the process of creating culture, Nishikawa emphasizes the individual 
as the shaper of his own culture: an individual may be brought up in a 
culture he is born into; he internalizes the values and world view of its 
culture, but he does not simply act out the norms of his culture when 
he deals with the existential problems he faces. He might understand 
that his own culture is but one way of understanding and organizing the 
world; his culture is quite an achievement, but inevitably imperfect as 
well as contradictory and limiting. He may learn the existence of other 
cultural traditions which suggest alternative ways of understanding and 
organizing the world. He is born a prisoner of his culture, but he does 
not have to remain one. Each individual ends up forming his own set of 
values; this I-Culture of the individual is in constant tension not so much 
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with other cultures as with the culture into which this individual is born. 
An individual can go beyond his natal culture and find genuineness in 
alternative way of doing things. 
Cultural diversity is neither an inconvenience that we must tolerate 
nor a difference that we must understand and respect in order to 
keep order and live in peace. It is rather a blessing; it is the space and 
opportunity where we can ﬁ nd alternative means of solving our problems 
and realizing ourselves otherwise impossible in the imperfect and limiting 
culture in which we are born into. The presence of other cultures enables 
us to look at and better understand our culture; it enables us to find 
ourselves and realize our potential. It is the presence of other cultures 
that makes it possible to encounter with my true self. Multiculturalism 
and cultural diversity within the border of the nation-state, therefore pose 
special challenges and opportunities.
But, all of us know only too well that cultures, as well as nation states 
and marriages demand undivided loyalty and guard their boundaries 
so jealously. Those who attempt to cross the borders are stigmatized 
as ‘hikokumin’ traitors, adulterers, abnormals and deviants; they are 
relentlessly punished. 
At the same time, all of us understand what the freedom of conscience 
is about. Not only conscience, but religion, art and science also claim the 
right to cross cultural as well as national boundaries now. Our bodies are 
classiﬁ ed as citizens of this nation or that nation, but our minds and spirits 
can cross cultural and national borders in search for the ways to ﬁ nd and 
realize ourselves and our potential.  Multiculturalism and cultural diversity 
is not about tolerating and respecting other cultures. It is about ﬁ nding 
one's true self and realizing one's potential. 
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Multicultulalism in Korea
With this in mind, let me begin my discussion on multiculturalism 
in Korea. As you know well, Korea has been long described as a racially 
homogenous state with a uniquely homogeneous culture and population. 
But recently it has become common to declare Korea as rapidly 
transforming itself into a multiracial and multicultural society, as the 
number of foreign nationals residing in Korea has reached one million, 
or more than two percent of the total population. With more than four 
out of ten single farmers marrying foreign women in 2006, scholars, NGO 
activists and reporters argue that Koreans must learn how to live with 
non-Koreans and be tolerant of other cultures.
The year 2006 marked a sudden increase in the media coverage 
and discussion of the conditions and policies for foreign brides and 
workers in Korea. The visit of Hines Ward, a biracial Korean who won 
the Most Valuable Player award in the US Super Bowl, was a sort of a 
watershed. He was hailed as a proud son of Korea and a symbol of what 
Korea might achieve if it could cease to be a single-raced nation and 
promote multiculturalism. The oﬃ  cial discourse has taken a positive turn 
and advocated for multiculturalism, which is a far cry from the official 
affirmation of a single nation state in the past. From now on, cultural 
diversity and the presence of immigrants are to be viewed as an important 
asset in Korea's effort for continued development in an increasingly 
globalizing world. When President Roh stressed the need to stop teaching 
ethnic homogeneity and embrace the tenets of multiculturalism, diﬀ erent 
government agencies came up with various projects to help foreign brides 
adjust themselves to Korea: NGOs found themselves on the receiving end 
of sudden increases in government subsidies for their activities, while 
scholars and research institutions suddenly found research money and 
support at every turn. 
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As this sudden enthusiasm for multiculturalism was largely the 
result of changes in the attitudes of government agencies and the mass 
media, some critical observers called it "state-sponsored multiculturalism" 
or "government-led multiculturalism." The flimsy basis of this kind of 
official multiculturalism was revealed in the recent uproar over the 
recommendation of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD). All the major newspapers in Korea 
reported that the CERD expressed concern over the Korean emphasis on 
the ethnic homogeneity of the nation and that CERD had recommended 
Korea stop using such expressions as sunhyeol (pure-blood) and honhyeol 
(mixed-blood) as part of an eﬀ ort to reduce discrimination. In the report 
prepared and submitted by the Korean government to CERD in 2006, 
the government had repeatedly used phrases as "Korea is an ethnically 
homogeneous country" several times.（1） Although those who wrote this 
report intended it as an apology for the current state of aﬀ airs by invoking 
what they thought to be "historical facts" or "cultural traditions," to the 
CERD it appeared to be an eﬀ ort to justify Korea’s ethnic homogeneity. 
So, it was the accidental phrasing in the report submitted by the Korean 
government that caused CERD to express its concern that "the emphasis 
placed on the ethnic homogeneity of Korea may represent an obstacle to 
the promotion of tolerance and friendship among the diﬀ erent ethnic and 
national groups living within its territory.'' 
Even though there is a great deal of diversity and diﬀ erence, not to 
mention contradiction and competition, among the positions and policy 
proposals of government agencies, NGOs, and scholars (Kim H. 2006), the 
current discourses and practices of multiculturalism seem to share three 
common problems. First, enthusiastically embracing multiculturalism, the 
boosters for a new multiculturalism tend to regard a Korean nationalism 
that emphasizes ethnic homogeneity as the single most critical obstacle to 
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overcome in Korea's transition toward a multicultural society. For many 
NGO workers and scholars, as well as those government officials who 
prepared the report to CERD, ethnic nationalism is the cause for prejudice 
and discrimination. Therefore, discussions are focused on the need to 
outgrow this "old" idea that no longer ﬁ ts with a diﬀ erent reality. 
Second, current enthusiasm for multiculturalism assumes that the rate 
of increase in the numbers of immigrants will continue in the future, that 
foreign workers will continue to enter Korea, and that Korean farmers 
will continue to marry foreign-born women. Even if the number of foreign 
workers and spouses entering Korea continues to grow, the composition 
of incoming migrants might change. What is important is that very few 
people have seriously asked whether the number of the immigrants or 
their commitment to cultural assimilation warrants the generalization that 
Korea has become a multicultural society.
Third, those who promote multiculturalism in Korea have never paid 
due attention to what a multicultural/multiethnic society is and what kind 
of future lies ahead if Korea decides to oﬃ  cially adopt it as ethos. This may 
indicate that many advocates of multiculturalism in Korea are nationalists 
who view multiculturalism as a survival strategy for the nation-state. Of 
these three problems, this paper will focus on the ﬁ rst, as the remaining 
two will be addressed by other articles in this special issue.
Here, I intend to examine the long-forgotten naturalization practices 
and policies of traditional Korea that existed long before the advent of a 
single-raced nationalism, one based on the transformation of Dangun from 
the ﬁ rst king into the biological ancestor of Koreans.  I would like to attend 
to the following three issues. First, the so-called ethnic nationalism that 
underlines the purity of Korean blood is not an integral part of Korean 
tradition. In addition, it is erroneous to say that Koreans lack a historical 
experience of living together with foreigners, as many scholars and 
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laymen along with the government oﬃ  cials who prepared the report to 
CERD repeatedly mentioned. Traditional Korea had clear policy principles 
and practices concerning immigration and naturalization (hyanghwa, 向
化 ). Moreover, traditional Korea did not consider itself to be an ethnically 
homogeneous state, and did not discriminate against foreigners simply on 
the basis of their ethnic origins. 
Second, ethnic homogeneity in Korean nationalism is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Korean nationalism, although superﬁ cially focused on 
the point of ethnic homogeneity, was really based on a profound sense of 
cultural distinctiveness and superiority. Such expressions as "We Koreans, 
the descendants of Dangun," which is now touted as the proof of the 
consanguinity of the Korean people, was ﬁ rst introduced not to emphasize 
the blood relationship of Koreans, but to emphasize the history of Korean 
political and cultural life as being old as that of China. It was only in the 
last century that Dangun began to be taken as the biological father of 
Koreans.
Third, the logic follows that those who identify ethnic homogeneity as 
the main cause for prejudice and discrimination against foreign workers 
and brides are actually engaging the wrong enemy, since the real cause 
of prejudice is this very sense of cultural distinctiveness and superiority. 
Therefore, even if Koreans succeed in doing away with the notion of 
ethnic homogeneity, this will not automatically make Korean society 
tolerant of different cultures and values. Naive is the assumption that 
classiﬁ cations of people according to their bloodline is outdated and wrong 
and that diﬀ erentiation on the basis of culture is modern and good. 
If we realize that cultural discrimination based on the sense of being 
civilized (and therefore superior) may be more persistent and dangerous 
than the concept of ethnic homogeneity, one is able to understand why 
multiculturalism can be so easily embraced by nationalists. What is needed 
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is a serious reexamination of nationalism in Korea.
Many scholars and laymen believe that Korean nationalism is 
essentially an ethnic nationalism because Koreans not only say that they 
have a common language, history and set of customs, but also that they 
are descendants of a common ancestor ‒ Dangun. However, as mentioned 
above, the idea that Korea is a state made of a single homogeneous ethnic 
group is an idea that emerged quite recently. The people of Goryeo and 
Joseon did not believe that they shared a common biological ancestor and 
welcomed many foreigners to Korea without discriminating against them 
simply on the basis of ethnic diﬀ erence.
The people of Goryeo and Joseon declared themselves to be the 
descendants of Dangun, but their intention stopped far short of any claims 
to be blood relatives. What they meant was that Goryeo and Joseon were 
the successors of the ancient kingdom of Joseon (Gojoseon or Old Joseon, 
distinguished from the Joseon founded by Yi Seong-Gye in 1392), which 
was founded by Dangun. In fact, the Dangun myth（2） itself asserts that 
he was the ﬁ rst king of Korea, not the progenitor of the Korean people. 
However, even scholars fail to critically review this misconception and 
blame the Dangun myth as the source of ethnic nationalism in Korea. 
Indeed, in traditional Korea, Dangun was not perceived as the symbol 
of the blood ties of the Korean people, but as the founder of the ﬁ rst state 
formed in Korea: his importance lay only in his having been a political 
leader, not a biological progenitor.  The records of Dangun’s foundation of 
Korea (Gojoseon) during the same year as the ancient Chinese King Yao 
( 堯 ) indicate that the political history of Korea is as long as that of China. 
Later, Gija ( 箕子 ), a sage of the late Shang ( 商 ) dynasty, ﬂ ed to Gojoseon 
when the persecution of sages by King Zhou ( 紂 ), the last king of the 
Shang dynasty, occurred. He founded Gija Joseon when the present king, 
a descendant of Dangun, abdicated his power, and, according to the thesis, 
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civilized Korea under his rule. 
For the Koreans during the Joseon period, the important point was 
that Goryeo and Joseon were no less splendid than China, as they are 
the successors of the ancient kingdom of Gojoseon, which was founded 
by Dangun and civilized by Gija: it did not matter whether they were 
one big family related through blood or not.  Neither the scholars nor 
the politicians of Joseon argued that all Koreans were blood relatives of 
Dangun. Dangun’s importance lay in his having been the founder of the 
early Korean state, not in being the progenitor for all people living in 
Korea.  
Traditional Korean Policies and Treatment of Immigrants
Although bloodlines were important, Confucianism put greater 
emphasis on learning and cultivation of the self. An ancient sage king such 
as Yao chose to give the throne to a wise person, not to his biological son. 
If noble birth did not automatically qualify a person for high oﬃ  ce, and if 
diligent study, cultivation of the mind, and moral training deﬁ ned a man 
worth, then it followed that a man from a poor family could somehow 
improve himself and achieve the status of enlightenment. Likewise, it was 
not so farfetched to suppose that barbarians could achieve civilization 
through concerted eﬀ ort. 
As Korea prided itself on having achieved the status of civilization 
through the teachings of Gija, Koreans were ready to agree that birth itself 
did not condemn a person to uncivilized status. Civilization was attainable 
to those who chose to change and make the necessary eﬀ ort, as expressed 
partly in the government policy towards foreign defectors to Korea. A 
Jurchen chief or a Japanese pirate could become a civilized Korean by 
discarding his old ways to adopt a Korean way of life and cultivate himself. 
It may have taken time, but was not impossible. Therefore, discrimination 
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was theoretically based on one’s intention to assimilate or not, and not on 
place of birth or ethnic origin. This idea of the possibility of improving 
human character was one of the principles that directed Joseon's policy 
toward immigrants and their naturalization. This line of reasoning is 
always twofold: the barbarians can be civilized; and the barbarians should 
be assimilated.
Another important principle is found in Confucian political philosophy 
which supposes that people should admire a good ruler. Ancient Confucian 
texts are full of records in which people left their country for another 
ruled by a good king, or loyally followed their good ruler when he was 
forced into exile. The ideal king in Confucianism was also supposed to be 
a great civilizer and reformer who could inﬂ uence subjects in the same 
way as "the blowing wind makes the grass bend." So foreigners, defecting 
from their own countries to seek permission to reside in Korea, were 
not regarded as simple refugees. They were the very proof that a given 
Korean ruler was a virtuous king admired by people from the outside. It 
was his reputation as a virtuous ruler that brought these foreigners to 
Korea. Therefore, they were welcomed by the government, which felt 
itself obliged to treat them with good manners, justice, and fairness, not to 
mention compassion.
Both Goryeo and Joseon adopted Tang China's practices and 
maintained a policy of welcoming and treating well those foreigners who 
voluntarily came and naturalized themselves. The government of Joseon 
had the principle of "stopping neither those who wanted to come nor 
those who wanted to leave" (Han M. 2001). It would exempt Jurchen and 
Japanese immigrants from taxation to help their settlement in Korea. 
These settlers were free from paying land taxes for three years and from 
corvee labor for ten years (Han M. 2001). 
During the Joseon period, many Japanese migrated to Korea partly 
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because of economic distress and hardships in life. The government 
of Joseon chose to accept these Japanese as part of a countermeasure 
against the Japanese pirate raiders (waegu 倭寇 ).  When the number of 
descendants of these Japanese and Jurchen immigrants began to grow, 
some government officials wanted to put them on the military register 
and make them pay military taxes. However, some government oﬃ  cials 
argued against this policy, saying that it is against the rules of treating 
guests who had come from afar. Others argued that it would make their 
livelihoods difficult if the government began to require military service 
from third-generation immigrants. After some deliberation in front of the 
king, the government decided to start to require military service from the 
fourth-generation of immigrants.
Besides tax exemptions, Joseon allowed these naturalized immigrants 
and their descendents opportunities to take state examinations for public 
office. Sometimes, the government appointed many of these to public 
oﬃ  ces according to their respective knowledge and skills in serving the 
national interest. Those who had strong family background, or a large 
following, or expertise in medicine or shipbuilding were preferred. The 
Joseon government helped defectors fleeing from economic distress 
in their own country or prisoners of war to settle in small groups and 
granted them patches of land in the provinces with the goal of assimilating 
them into the population (Han M. 2001: 49). It is interesting to note that 
Joseon also gave some consideration to immigrants in the criminal justice 
system. Immigrants and their descendants who committed crimes in 
Joseon were put on trial and punished by the penal codes of Joseon. 
However, the "rule of leniency" was applied so that they were punished 
less severely than native Koreans (Han M. 2001: 196). It also seems that 
many naturalized immigrants were able to marry Korean women and bear 
children. 
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Cultural Superiority Rather Than Ethnic Homogeneity Responsible for 
Discrimination
The policies and treatment of immigrants to Joseon seem far kinder 
and less discriminating. Immigrants and their descendants enjoyed some 
government protection and even assumed public office. It reflects the 
assumption that one could dilute one's ethnicity by cultural assimilation, 
and that no discrimination should be caused by one's ethnic origin alone.  
However, there were negative phenomena as well. Joseon considered 
itself a civilization distinct from but equal in level to China, and looked 
down upon the Jurchen and Japanese. This caused the tendency for Joseon 
to regard Chinese immigrants and their descendants as more civilized, 
and to give them more favorable treatment in comparison to the Japanese 
and Manchurians who are, from the modern perspective, ethnically and 
linguistically far closer to Koreans. 
This sense of cultural superiority often translated into contempt, 
distrust, and ultimately, fear of the namely “uncivilized” peoples. In the 
Annals, there are many instances of discussions that indicated profound 
distrust and discrimination towards the Japanese and Jurchen. In one 
case, these people are presumed to have "a black spot in their hearts 
because they are not one of our kind". In many parts of the Annals of 
King Yeonsan, such phrases as "Although it may have been so in the 
past, how could we trust those who have a human face but a beastly 
heart?" are frequently found. Such a sense of distrust and contempt, 
typical of the Orientalist, is again found in a proposal to build a castle wall 
and drive away the barbarians. These expressions do sound racist, but 
upon close reading of the text, especially the last part, we ﬁ nd that these 
government oﬃ  cials were trying to prevent the Jurchen from mixing with 
Koreans only when the former maintained their "barbarian" way of life. 
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The government wanted to draw the line between the civilized and the 
uncivilized, and allowed the Jurchen to cross this when they agreed to be 
civilized, that is, assimilated to Korean ways.
There was also a consideration of national security. The government 
did not seem to completely trust the naturalized Japanese. It took the 
cautious approach of not allowing these defectors and refugees to live in a 
large group, but divided them into small groups and gave them parcels of 
land to settle in remote villages. The Joseon government was ready to help 
foreign immigrants settle in Korea and assimilate themselves to a Korean 
(namely “civilized”) way of life, but was not tolerant of those who continued 
to keep their foreign (therefore “uncivilized”) ways. One government 
official who was a descendant of a naturalized Jurchen was severely 
criticized for having not discarded his ethnic customs. In several instances, 
the government was requested and decided to punish those immigrants 
who practiced their marriage custom of taking the wife of a deceased 
elder brother. Considering that such marriages had been practiced during 
the Goguryeo period and many other “barbarian marriage practices” were 
abolished only recently at the time through a vigorous Confucianization 
drive in the late Goryeo and early Joseon periods (Deuchler 1995), we can 
only guess the importance of the sense of cultivating “civilization” at that 
time. 
In this way, discrimination based on a sense of civilization and 
cultural superiority was far older and persistent than that based on ethnic 
nationalism developed only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This means that the sense of biological relatedness functioning 
as a source of discrimination, prejudice, distrust, and fear is a relatively 
recent trend. 
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The Production and Reproduction of Ethnic Homogeneity
It is not necessary here to discuss the formation of ethnic nationalism 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There are some 
detailed studies (Shin 2006; Schmid 2002) discussing the advent of 
nationalism emphasizing the ethnic homogeneity of Korean people during 
this period. Many Korean intellectuals and laymen, such as Shin Chae-ho, 
who participated in the formation of Korean nationalism, were obviously 
influenced by European thinkers, especially by Fichte and advocates of 
German nationalism, among others. The idea of ethnic homogeneity seems 
to have been borrowed from Fichte, who emphasized common blood as 
well as a common language and culture. As German nationalism was 
extremely influential and emulated in Japan, many Koreans may have 
learned about German nationalism through Japan. 
It is an irony that, in their struggle for independence, Korean 
independence movement leaders turned to Germany for inspiration in the 
same way the Japanese had done. Shin (2006) points out that the idea of 
ethnic homogeneity was developed by Koreans during the colonial period 
as a measure to counter the Japanese propagandist notion of naisen ittai 
(Korea and Japan are one and the same, 內鮮一體 ), embracing the view of 
Oguma (2005) and Lie (2001) that the idea of ethnic homogeneity came to 
be established in Japan only after the Paciﬁ c War. However, when closely 
read, Oguma is found to suggest that the notion of mixed races was not 
fundamentally different from that of a single race, because the former 
concept postulated that all the ethnic groups within the Japanese Empire 
were eventually related to one another. Therefore, it would be correct to 
say that Korean ethnic nationalism was developed under the inﬂ uence of 
Japanese as well as German nationalism. In addition, Korean nationalism 
might have adopted some elements of kokugaku ( 國 學 ) in the process 
of its search for a national identity independent of the Chinese view of 
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civilization. The Japanese version of nationalism was extremely attractive 
to the extent that even those who were infuriated at the imperialistic 
aggression of Japan were forced to admit the efficacy and capability of 
Japan while criticizing and hating the country. They were also impressed 
with the Japanese eﬀ orts at inventing tradition and constructing a national 
identity and culture. Even with animosity against the Japanese, Koreans 
were ready to study and learn Japanese institutions and policies, as well as 
their diligence and work ethic.
For these early leaders of Korean nationalism, Korea had to be a 
nation of people sharing a language, culture, history, and blood. It was 
when Korea lost its statehood through annexation to Japan that Dangun 
was transformed from a political leader into a mythic procreator of the 
Korean people. At the same time, the idea of "Gija as the Civilizer" became 
very awkward and inconvenient, since he was a Chinese, a foreigner. 
Korean intellectuals could not find a rightful place for Gija in the new 
brand of nationalism that emphasized ethnic homogeneity, and eventually 
established Dangun as a cultural hero to assume the role of Gija. This 
is how Dangun became the biological and cultural father of the Korean 
people. The expression "descendants of Dangun" now came to denote 
his genealogical descendants as well as the political successor to Dangun 
Joseon. 
Now, let us look at why this brand of nationalism, newly formed to 
ﬁ ght Japanese imperialism, continued to exercise such a great inﬂ uence 
long after the end of colonial rule in 1945, developed into modern Korean 
nationalism, and became reinforced through the experiences of economic 
growth, the democratization movement, and the foreign currency crisis. In 
Japan, the moral education of shushin ( 修身 ) with a focus on the national 
polity (kokutai, 國 體 ) was abolished in the education reform process by 
the Occupation Forces. The so-called imperial view of history disappeared 
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from the oﬃ  cial stage. However, curiously enough, in Korea, the inﬂ uence 
of Japanese imperialism remained in many ways. The imperialism that 
praised Japanese people and the Japanese leader was only replaced by 
the nationalism that praised the Korean people and the Korean leader: the 
contents were gone, but the forms remained. Especially after the Korean 
War, the national mobilization system was reestablished in the South as 
well as in the North. The war was over in Japan, but in Korea, that war 
continued in a sense. Its nationalistic elements were strengthened as 
the competition occurred between the North and the South over which 
side was more nationalistic, and therefore more legitimate. Despite the 
oﬃ  cial eﬀ ort to liquidate the colonial legacy, not much serious reﬂ ection 
or reexamination was made for the institutions and policy tools adopted 
and learned through the Japanese during the process of modernization. 
Therefore, while Japan and the Japanese were the object of hatred and 
rejection, many Japanese ways remained in Korea, and Japanese-style 
nationalism was not an exception.
When nationalism was regarded as more important than any other 
universal values, democratic processes, freedom of speech, and human 
rights were subject to suspension for the sake of the nation. Park Chung-
Hee and Kim Il Sung were champions of nationalism in their own ways, 
as they both shrewdly manipulated nationalist symbols and values in their 
eﬀ orts to overcome supposed "national crises." Park Chung-Hee competed 
not only with Kim over who was more nationalistic, but also with his 
political enemies, as well as student activists. With superpowers looming 
close by and national reunification ahead, they found Japanese-style 
German nationalism extremely convenient and attractive political tools. 
As Koreans recovered national pride and conﬁ dence as the result of the 
rapid economic growth in the 1960's and 1970's, the 1980's witnessed a 
resurgence of interest in things Korean. When this nostalgia joined hands 
29
Multiculturalism in Korea?
with commercialism, the search for and the invention of traditions came to 
be an important part of Korean cultural life. 
Conclusion
As we have examined, it was a sense of cultural superiority that 
was responsible for discrimination against foreigners in traditional Korea. 
The idea of ethnic homogeneity came relatively late, and remained to 
overshadow and characterize Korean nationalism because of the unusual 
political and cultural circumstances of the Korean War, national division, 
authoritarian rule, the Cold War, and myriad other factors. Especially 
important as a historical factor was the loss of confidence and pride in 
Korean civilization during the early modernization process. When both 
the West and Japan presented themselves with "superior" technology, 
scientific knowledge, and industrial power, Korea had to resort to the 
idea of a "Kultur"-style German nationalism and solidarity in the form of a 
symbology based on the myths of a common language and blood.
It is no wonder that Koreans had great diﬃ  culty overcoming ethnic 
nationalism if one considers the traumatic experience of war and division, 
as well as the depressing sense of being a victim in international power 
politics. Concerns and criticisms have been raised about the nature of 
Korean nationalism, but thus far, not very successfully. Recent enthusiasm 
for multiculturalism in Korea should be examined in this context. The 
discourse of multiculturalism is the terrain upon which advocates for 
human rights and other universal values pose a challenge to those who 
regard multiculturalism as a threat to the survival and prosperity of the 
nation-state. Ironically, it is not Charles Taylor but Siono Nanami who 
seems to give inspiration to many Koreans. According to her bestselling 
novel The Story of the Romans (roma-in iyagi, romajin monogatari), it 
was the Romans’ ﬂ exible attitudes to the absorption of foreign elements 
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without insisting on old ways that enabled them to build their mighty 
empire. Multiculturalism is identified with being a successful cultural 
borrowing or cultural hybrid.
However, multiculturalism may not remain a handy tool of the nation-
state. The idea of multiculturalism is inherently subversive to the nation-
state. The oﬃ  cial endorsement of a multiculturalist policy will inevitably 
invite questions of human rights and other universal values as well 
as complaints against reverse discrimination and increasing financial 
burden, for which few Koreans seem to be prepared at this time. Many 
essays and policy proposals that employ the expression "multicultural" 
do not properly address the question of the character and content of 
multicultural life. Instead, they accept multiculturalism simply as values to 
guide government policy and educate the general public, and do not show 
any concrete vision for the realization of multicultural society in Korea. 
As Oh Gyeong-seok (2007) correctly points out, what is needed is not the 
introduction or advocacy of multiculturalism, but an in-depth deliberation 
over what shape a multicultural society should take. 
Another cruc ia l  prob lem with the current  d iscourse on 
multiculturalism lies with the understanding of the concept of culture 
itself. Still firmly rooted in the idea of national culture, many advocates 
of multiculturalism in Korea are not prepared to see diversity within a 
culture, nor are they prepared to recognize an individual except as a 
member of a clear, distinct, and homogeneous cultural or ethnic group. 
Without the ability to accept that what is now called Korean culture may 
simply be an outcome of ongoing compromises, competitions, negotiations, 
and contradictions between different cultures, one ends up with the 
rigid notion that cultures always have to be defined according to their 
respective boundaries and closures. 
One problem with multiculturalism is that it tends to make us take 
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national and cultural boundaries for granted. In the naïve belief that 
diﬀ erentiation on the basis of culture is far better than that on the basis 
of blood, we are misled to overlook the ideology of the nation-state that 
lies beneath the concept of culture, something that Nishikawa (2006) 
so eloquently pointed out. It is regretful that some cultural education 
materials developed under the auspices of government agencies have 
attempted to teach the essence of different national cultures to Korean 
husbands and family members of migrant women, believing that such 
cultural knowledge would promote mutual understanding and peaceful 
assimilation. I ﬁ rmly believe that cultural education should be targeted to 
protect individuals' rights and choices, develop their ability to negotiate 
and compromise, and help ﬁ nd a solution for existential problems rather 
than foster understanding and preserving of diﬀ erent cultural traditions as 
is the case in current multicultural policies in Korea. 
Notes
For example, the report said on page one, "4. The Republic of Korea is an ethnically 
homogeneous country with a total population of 47,254,000 as of November 2005. 
However, the ethnic composition of the population is not clearly documented since 
the Republic of Korea does not conduct a census on ethnicity." Also on page ten, "43. 
As an ethnically homogeneous State, the Republic of Korea has been traditionally 
unfamiliar with the problems of ethnic minorities. However, the dynamic exchange 
of human resources between countries and an increase in the number of interracial 
marriages have recently raised a range of concerns involving ethnic minorities." "44. 
The principle of the ‘pure-blooded’, based on the Republic of Korea’s pride in the 
nation’s ethnic homogeneity, has incurred various forms of discrimination, largely 
invisible and not illegal, against so-called ‘mixed-bloods’ in all areas of life including 
employment, marriage, housing, education and interpersonal relationships. This is 
particularly serious since such practices are passed down from one generation to 
the next."
The earliest records on Dangun are found in Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three 
Kingdoms, 三國遺事 ) and Jewang ungi (Songs of Emperors and Kings, 帝王韻紀 ).
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